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[1] 
The Arc of History in Patent Subject Matter1 
ROBIN FELDMAN 
In law, as in so much of life, there is an arc of history. We may move 
forward with a slow and fitful gait, but the trajectory is clear. The question 
for those who must apply or interpret patent law is whether to follow that 
arc or to push against it. 
With patentable subject matter, the modern arc began with the first of 
the Alice quartet of Supreme Court cases.2 In its 2010 decision, Bilski, the 
Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit and rejected the machine-or-
transformer test in a case related to hedging strategies.3 In Mayo, the 
Supreme Court again rejected the Federal Circuit’s analysis, overturning 
the Federal Circuit’s attempt to apply the machine-or-transformer test in a 
case related to medical diagnostics.4 In Myriad, the Supreme Court, for a 
third time, rejected the Federal Circuit’s test and analysis in a case related 
to patenting genes.5 In Alice, the Supreme Court delineated its own rule and 
 
 1.  This essay is based on remarks by Professor Robin Feldman, the Arthur J. 
Goldberg Professor and Director of the Center for Innovation, University of California 
Hastings College of the Law, to the US Patent and Trademark Office. See U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office, Roundtable 2: Exploring the Legal Contours of Patent Subject Matter 
Eligibility Before the US Patent and Trademark Office (Dec. 5, 2016) (statement by Prof. 
Robin Feldman at 37). 
 2.  The Alice quartet refers to the four Supreme Court cases between 2010 and 2014 
on patentable subject matter jurisdiction. The four cases are Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 
(2010); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc. (Mayo), 566 U.S. 66 (2012); 
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. (Myriad), 569 U.S. 576 (2013); and 
Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l (Alice), 573 U.S. 208 (2014). For a discussion on the 
Alice quartet and the progression of the Federal Circuit, see generally Robin Feldman, 
Coming of Age for the Federal Circuit, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 27, 30-33 (2014) [hereinafter 
Feldman, Coming of Age for the Federal Circuit]. See also Robin Feldman, A Conversation 
on Judicial Decision Making, 5 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 1 (2012) [hereinafter Feldman, 
A Conversation on Judicial Decision-Making]. 
 3.  Bilski, 561 U.S. at 612. See Feldman, Coming of Age for the Federal Circuit, supra 
note 2, at 31. 
 4.  Mayo, 566 U.S. at 88, 92. See Feldman, Coming of Age for the Federal Circuit, 
supra note 2, at 31 ([T]he Justices suggested that they disagreed with everything the Federal 
Circuit had ever said about this area of patent law in the Circuit’s 30-year history.). 
 5.  Myriad, 569 U.S. at 596. See Robin Feldman, Coming of Age for the Federal 
Circuit, supra note 2, at 32. 
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“established a two-part test for distinguishing ineligible patents that merely 
claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from eligible 
patents that appropriately claim applications of those basic building 
blocks.”6 
With each additional step along this broader trajectory, some on the 
bench and bar have tried to wave it away by arguing that the trajectory is 
no more than an optical illusion.7 It cannot be. It must not be. I confess 
there are times I have joined that chorus of dissenters as well.8 This has had 
no more effect than whistling into the wind, and there is little reason to 
believe that pressing against the arc of history will be any more successful 
going forward. 
For example, after Bilski, we said, “the Court didn’t eliminate 
machine-or-transformation, so everything is business as usual”;9 after Mayo 
and Myriad,10 the refrain was “well, that’s only for life science cases,”11 
and since Alice, the refrain has been, “they didn’t ban software patenting, 
so we will find a way.”12 Many Circuit decisions during this quartet period 
 
 6.  See Feldman, Coming of Age for the Federal Circuit, supra note 2, at 32. See 
Alice, 573 U.S. at 218, 221 (describing the two part test as first, whether the patent is 
directed at an ineligible category and second, looking at additional elements of the claim to 
determine whether the inventive concept makes the patent more than a patent based on an 
ineligible concept) (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72, 80 (2012)). 
 7.  See Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Linear LLC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 614, 622-23 (N.D. Ill. 
2015) (stating that the “preemptive concern [in Alice] is construed carefully, however, ‘lest 
it swallow all of patent law.’”) (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 70-71); Gust, Inc., v. Alphacap 
Ventures, LLC, 905 F.3d 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[P]atent eligibility after Alice was 
settled.”); CG Tech. Dev., LLC v. Bwin. Party (USA), Inc., No. 216CV00871RCJVCF, 2017 
WL 58575, at n.4 (D. Nev. Jan. 4, 2017) (“. . . Alice Corp. did not create the abstractness bar 
to patentability but rather introduced new language to apply an old rule, just as other cases 
in this line had done.”).  
 8.  See Brief of Amici Curiae Professor Robin Feldman and the U.C. Hastings 
Institute for Innovation Law in Support of Neither Party at, 22-29, Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. 
CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) (suggesting that a concept of commercial 
application, which could be distinguished from the Supreme Court’s field of use doctrine, 
could separate patentable subject matter from unpatentable subject matter in the areas in 
which the doctrine has struggled); see also ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW 128-
134 (Harvard 2012) (suggesting that logical tension in the area could be resolved if the 
Supreme Court approached the area of field of use restrictions in a different manner); 
Feldman, A Conversation on Judicial Decision-Making, supra note 2, at 28-30 (elaborating 
on the concept in the context of life science inventions).   
 9.  Bilski, 561 U.S. at 612. See also Feldman, Coming of Age for the Federal Circuit, 
supra note 2, at 30 (“[A] majority of the Supreme Court Justices ruled in Bilski that 
machine-or-transformation, while a useful clue, certainly was not the sole test for 
determining subject matter patentability.”). 
 10.  Mayo, 566 U.S. 66; Myriad, 569 U.S. 576. See also Feldman, A Conversation on 
Judicial Decision-Making, supra note 2, at 22-23.  
 11.  See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 70; Myriad, 569 U.S. at 589. 
 12.  See Alice, 573 U.S. at 226. 
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have come perilously close to what I would call, “reversal from below.”13 
And through the entire time, the fervently whispered prayer has been that 
the Supreme Court will get tired of patent law, or tired of being criticized, 
and will leave us to do what we do best. The Justices have not tired of 
patent law—in fact it continues to occupy a remarkable amount of their 
docket.14 Reversal from below, is a treacherous path, one that is usually 
unsuccessful in the long run. 
The latest wave of Federal Circuit decisions again pushes back on the 
Supreme Court’s trajectory. Yes, many, many software patents have been 
invalidated under Alice15, and its two-step process, in which a court must 
determine first, whether the claim is directed to a forbidden category such 
as abstract ideas, and second, whether the claim adds significantly more.16 
But after taking some time, the Federal Circuit has found ways to ease the 
two-step tango. The Amdocs case opined that there is no workable 
definition of an abstract idea.17 The Enfish case held that courts must be 
careful not to apply too high a level of abstraction.18 And the McRO 
 
 13.  See Brief of Amici Curiae Professor Robin Feldman, et al., in Support of Petitioner 
at 3, Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017) (No. 
15-1189) (“With each battle, the Circuit has tried to introduce concepts that would have the 
effect of nullifying the doctrine [of patent exhaustion], in a manner that is tempting to 
characterize as reversal from below.”). 
 14.  For a list of Supreme Court patent cases, See Written Description, http://writ 
tendescription.blogspot.com/p/patents-scotus.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2019) (Reporting 
that the United States Supreme Court reviewed two patent cases in its 2019 term and 3 
patent cases in its 2018 term). See also U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-16-490, 
Intellectual Property: Patent Office Should Define Quality, Reassess Incentives, and 
Improve Clarity (2016) (“GAO found that district court filings of new patent infringement 
lawsuits increased from about 2,000 in 2007 to more than 5,000 in 2015, while the number 
of defendants named in these lawsuits increased from 5,000 to 8,000 over the same 
period.”); Paul R. Gugliuzza, How Much Has the Supreme Court Changed Patent Law?, 16 
CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 330, 330 (2017) (“The U.S. Supreme Court has decided a 
remarkable number of patent cases in the past decade, particularly as compared to the first 
twenty years of the Federal Circuit’s existence.”). 
 15.  E.g., Secured Mail Sols. LLC v. Universal Wilde, Inc., 873 F.3d 905, 909 (Fed. Cir. 
2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2000 (2018); Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, 
Inc., 882 F.3d 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2018); In re Marco Guldenaar Holding B.V., 911 F.3d 1157 
(Fed. Cir. 2018); Roche Molecular Sys., Inc. v. CEPHEID, 905 F.3d 1363, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 
2018); BSG Tech LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Interval 
Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1335, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 16.  Alice, 573 U.S. at 217-18, 221. See also Feldman, Coming of Age for the Federal 
Circuit, supra note 2, at 32. 
 17.  Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc. (Amdocs), 841 F.3d 1288, 1294, 
1306 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 18.  Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp. (Enfish), 822 F.3d 1327, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(“However, describing the claims at such a high level of abstraction and untethered from the 
language of the claims all but ensures that the exceptions to [35 USCA § 101] swallow the 
rule.”). 
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holding is best summed up by the Patently-O headline, “Step One: Don’t 
Assume an Abstract Idea.”19 As much as one might hope, it’s hard to 
imagine that this wave of Federal Circuit decisions will be greeted any 
more warmly by the Supreme Court than the last. 
Some individuals on both sides of the question of how broadly patents 
should reach have hoped that Congress will intervene. Congress has the 
authority to overturn the Supreme Court’s subject matter decisions, 
accelerate and enhance the Court’s decisions, or even cut back on aspects 
of post-grant review from the America Invents Act.20 None of the tea 
leaves of Congress’ prior behavior suggest that Congress is likely to weigh 
in.21 
So what is the United States Patent and Trademark Office to do, as it 
is buffeted by the winds of this less than cordial interchange between two 
levels of the judiciary? And of course, the agency itself may have internal 
cheering sections for particular viewpoints, not to mention pressure from 
those who use its services.22 The patent office, however, has an unusual 
level of responsibility, given 1) the twenty-year lag time once a patent has 
been granted23 and 2) the nature of modern patent markets.24 
 
 19.  McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc. (McRO), 837 F.3d 1299, 1314-16 
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Claim 1 is not directed to an abstract idea and recites subject matter as a 
patentable process under [35 USCA § 101].”). 
 20.  America Invents Act, Post-Grant Review, 35 U.S.C.A. § 321 (2012). 
 21.  Since Alice was decided, many bills have been introduced into Congress that deal 
with patent subject matter, but only one directly targeted the Alice decision. In the Restoring 
America’s Leadership in Innovation Act of 2018, H.R. 6264, 115th Cong. (2018), section 
7(b)(3) sought to amend Section 102 of title 35 of the United States Code to “abrogate Alice 
Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) and its predecessors to ensure that 
life sciences discoveries, computer software, and similar inventions and discoveries are 
patentable, and that those patents are enforceable.” However, after being introduced, the bill 
failed, never emerging from its assigned committee. Similarly, fourteen bills have been 
introduced into Congress since 2014 related to post-grant review but only one, H.R. 6264, 
supra, at section 4(c)(1), derides it stating, “[I]nter partes review and post-grant review 
proceedings introduced by the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act have harmed the progress 
of science and the useful arts by subjecting inventors to serial challenges to patents.” See 
also Support Technology and Research for Our Nation’s Growth and Economic Resilience 
Patents Act of 2017, S. 1390, 115th Cong. (2017); Support Technology and Research for 
Our Nation’s Growth Patents Act of 2015, S. 632, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 22.  See generally General Information Concerning Patents, United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (Oct. 2015), https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/general-
information-concerning-patents (last visited Mar. 26, 2019) (noting that “Interpretations of 
the statute by the courts have defined the limits of the field of subject matter that can be 
patented, thus it has been held that the laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract 
ideas are not patentable subject matter.”). 
 23.  35 U.S.C.A. § 154 (West 2015). 
 24.  Sara Jeruss, Robin Feldman & Joshua Walker, The America Invents Act 500: 
Effects of Patent Monetization Entities on US Litigation, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 357, 
369 (2012) (“In the modern patent market, however, one sees the emergence of numerous 
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For example, there was a time when we could say with confidence 
that 90% of patents would never garner a return.25 These shadow patents 
hovered on the periphery of the innovation system, doing little damage.26 
But the world has changed. With modern secondary markets, patents are 
easily traded, grouped, and launched as a bundle against product-producing 
companies.27 In particular, the 2016 Federal Trade Commission report on 
Patent Assertion Entities concluded that for an entire category of players in 
the patent market, the business model is a nuisance one.28 And, while the 
number of patent lawsuits has gone up and down in the last few years,29 the 
down years are still vastly above the number twelve years ago, even 
accounting for changes brought about by the America Invents Act.30 
 
entities whose core activity is creation of an income stream from the patent market itself. 
These entities are developing in new and unusual ways—a reminder that any term 
describing such entities must be sufficiently flexible and broad.”). 
 25.  Robin Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs, 18 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 250, 264 
(2013) (“The vast majority of patents have never directly earned a return for the patent 
holder. Estimates suggest that the number is well above 90%.”). See also Gideon 
Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5 (2005) 
(referring to estimates that suggest less than 5 percent of patents hold any value); Edmund 
W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 267 (1977). 
 26.  Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs, supra note 25, at 272-73. 
 27.  Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs, supra note 25, at 254, 267-68 (“We need a 
mechanism for restraining inappropriate use of intellectual property and for signaling the 
difference between the acceptable pursuit of a return from your intellectual property and the 
inappropriate oppression of others, using the legal system and societally granted privileges 
as a weapon.”). See also Mark A. Lemley & Robin Feldman, Is Patent Enforcement 
Efficient, 98 B.U. L. REV. 649, 658 (2018). 
 28.  Federal Trade Commission, Patent Assertion Entity Activity: An FTC Study 8 
(2016) (“Ninety-three percent of reported Litigation [Patent Assertion Entity] licenses 
followed a lawsuit against the eventual licensee and 77% were valued at less than the 
estimated cost of defending a patent lawsuit through the end of discovery—a threshold 
below which litigation settlements might be considered nuisance value.”). See Id.at 101 
(“The FTC likewise observed Litigation [Patent Assertion Entity] behavior that was 
consistent with nuisance-value litigation.”). 
 29.  U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-16-490, Intellectual Property: Patent Office 
Should Define Quality, Reassess Incentives, and Improve Clarity 15 (2016), (discussing the 
increase in patent litigation from 2007 to 2015 with a decrease in litigation in 2014 being 
attributable to the decision in Alice). 
 30.  See Robin Feldman, Tom Ewing, Sara Jeruss, The AIA 500 Expanded: The Effects 
of Patent Monetization Entities, 17 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 77 (2013) (“Although the number 
of defendants decreased in 2012, possibly in response to changes in joinder rules from the 
America Invents Act, the number of defendants sued by patent monetization entities, as well 
as the percentage of litigation filed by patent monetization entities, is far higher today than it 
was six years ago.”). See generally U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-16-490, 
Intellectual Property: Patent Office Should Define Quality, Reassess Incentives, and 
Improve Clarity15 (2016). But see B. Zorina Khan, Property Rights and Patent Litigation in 
Early Nineteenth-Century America, 55 J. ECON. HIST. 58, 837 (1995) (analyzing the rates of 
litigation from 1790 to 1860 to refute the alleged “explosion” of litigation).   
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The burden on innovation industries is not small. As we sit in Silicon 
Valley, I note that the work of many scholars has carefully documented the 
damage modern patent assertion is causing for startups and small 
enterprises—not to mention more mature companies.31 
 
31 31.  See Robin Feldman, Patent Demands & Startup Companies: The View from the 
Venture Capital Community, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 236, 263-64 (2014) (reporting the 
findings of a surveying study where 70% of responding venture capitalists reported that they 
have portfolio companies that received a patent demand and 79% of responding venture 
capitalists reported that the number of demands received increased in the last 5 years); See 
Id. at 280-81 (“[T]he venture-backed company community overwhelmingly views patent 
demands as a negative for their industry, does not think about the potential for reselling 
patents when deciding whether to invest in a  company, and would pause before investing in 
a company that had an existing patent demand against it.”); Robin Feldman and Evan 
Frondorf, Patent Demands and Initial Public Offerings, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 52, 89 
(2015) [hereinafter Feldman, Patent Demands and Initial Public Offerings] (reporting the 
results of a survey of companies before or after their IPO and concluding that 
“[R]espondents continued to overwhelmingly agree that patent demands were problematic 
in their sectors, with many also believing that patent demands had specific negative impacts 
on their companies.”); Feldman, supra note 30, at 7 (“[I]n 2012, litigation by patent 
monetization entities represented a majority of the patent litigation filed in the United 
States.”); Lemley, supra note 27, at 651 (“[Non-Practicing Entities] now account  
for the majority of patent lawsuits filed in the United States.”). See also Colleen Chien, 
Patent Assertion and Startup Innovation, Open Technology Institute, New America 
Foundation 4 (2013), https://www.newamerica.org/oti/policy-papers/patent-assertion-and-
startup-innovation/ [hereinafter Chien, Patent Assertion and Startup Innovation] (“[Patent] 
assertions have added friction to technology transactions, reduced the value of pursued 
startups, and triggered large indemnities, according to study subjects.”); see also Colleen 
Chien, Patent Assertion and Startup Innovation, Open Technology Institute, New America 
Foundation 4 (2013), https://www.newamerica.org/oti/policy-papers/patent-assertion-and-
startup-innovation/ [hereinafter Chien, Patent Assertion and Startup Innovation] (“[Patent] 
assertions have added friction to technology transactions, reduced the value of pursued 
startups, and triggered large indemnities, according to study subjects.”); Colleen Chien, 
Patent Assertion Entities, Presentation at Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department 
of Justice Workshop, 2-3 (Dec. 10, 2012) (“[Patent Assertion Entities] make it economical 
to bring suit, and economical for the defendant to settle, regardless of the merits.”); 
Tracking PAE Activity: A Post-script to the DOJ Review, RPX Rational Patent: Intelligence, 
http://www.rpxcorp.com/intelligence/blog/tracking-pae-activity-a-post-script-to-the-doj-review/ 
(Mar. 19, 2019), (“For the first time, in 2012, PAEs filed the majority of patent suits: 2,921 
of 4,701 suits, representing 62% of all patent suits.”); James Bessen & Michael Meurer, The 
Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 387, 389 (2014) (describing the 
Patent Assertion Entities as exacting a tax on innovation in the amount of $29 billion in 
2011); Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing: Could a Patent Term 
Reduction Decimate Trolls Without Harming Innovators?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1312 
(2013) (“NPEs account for more than two-thirds of suits and over 80% of infringement 
claims litigated in the final three years of the patent term.”); JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. 
MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS 
AT RISK 16 (Princeton Univ. Press, 2008) (arguing that outside the pharmaceutical and 
chemistry industries, the costs of litigating patents outweigh the earnings gained from 
patents). But see Stephen Haber, Patents and the Wealth of Nations, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
811, 832 (“There is also no convincing evidence that PAEs negatively affect innovation.”); 
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And the patent office has faced more than its fair share of blame. The 
2013 GAO report pointed at poor patent quality as a cause of pain in the 
patent system.32 However, the problems are not just in the tech industry—
weak life science patents contribute to schemes that fuel popular outrage 
about rising drug prices.33 
In short, the patent office experiences a great burden to “get it right.” 
When the agency follows the ebb and flow of the battle between different 
levels of the judiciary, that strategy leaves long-term damage in its wake. 
The rules may change when issues reach the Supreme Court, but for patents 
granted in the interim, there is a twenty-year tail.34  Thus, I urge a large 
dose of caution. The temptation to jump forward as the Federal Circuit 
pushes back on Supreme Court doctrine misses the arc of history. And 




Alexander Galetovic, Stephen Haber & Ross Levine, An Empirical Examination of Patent 
Holdup, 11 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 549, 561 (2015) (an empirical study suggesting that 
there is a one-to-one relationship between changes in quality-adjusted relative prices and 
differential rates of productivity growth across industries); Michael Risch, Patent Troll 
Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 458-60 (2012) (arguing that NPEs are a microcosm of 
innovative markets and concluding that “an NPE bringing a lawsuit could just as well be the 
entity that sought the patent initially in the first place.”); Khan, supra note 30, at 833. B. 
Zorina Khan, Trolls and Other Patent Inventions: Economic History and the Patent 
Controversy in the Twenty-First Century, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 825, 832-33 (2014). 
 32.  See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-13-465, Intellectual Property: Assessing 
Factors That Affect Patent Infringement Litigation Could Help Improve Patent Quality, 32 
(2013) (“[T]he prevalence of low quality patents was driving recent increases in litigation 
more than PME suits.”); Chien, Patent Assertion and Startup Innovation, supra note 31, at 
15 (“Poor patent quality harms startups and small companies, said respondents, when 
‘[l]arge companies use their arsenal of patents to file frivolous lawsuits,’ ‘[d]eserving 
patents get same timeline as undeserving ones,’ and ‘[obvious] [s]oftware patents hurt 
innovation and destroy jobs,’ in the words of respondents.”) (citing from the study 
documented in the article). See also Feldman, Patent Demands and Initial Public Offerings, 
supra at note 31, at 58-59. 
 
 33.  See Feldman, supra note 30, at 365-66. See also Robin C. Feldman and Mark A. 
Lemley, The Sound and Fury of Patent Activity, (Stanford Law and Economics Olin 
Working Paper No. 521; Stanford Public Law Working Paper; UC Hastings Research Paper 
No. 290), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3195988. Robin Feldman, 
Evan Frondorf, Andrew K. Cordova & Connie Wang, Empirical Evidence of Drug Pricing 
Games - A Citizen’s Pathway Gone Astray, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 39 , 42 (2017) 
(“[A]necdotal evidence has percolated in recent years about new forms of strategic behavior 
designed to keep drug prices artificially inflated by blocking generic entry.”); Robin 
Feldman and Connie Wang, A Citizen’s Pathway Gone Astray – Delaying Competition from 
Generic Drugs, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1499 (2017); Feldman, Intellectual Property 
Wrongs, supra note 25, at 268-69. 
 34.  35 U.S.C.A. § 154 (2015). 
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